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The study reported in this paper explored the self-regulatory approaches in terms of health and 
safety (H&S) in the Nigerian construction industry and the attitudes of the industry towards 
H&S self-regulation. This stems from the premise that the Nigerian construction industry has 
been viewed as unregulated, but evidence in literature indicates that some parts of the industry 
are self-regulated in various forms. However, it is unclear how self-regulation occurs in the 
industry, its approaches and the attitudes of the industry towards it. Based on group and 
individual interviews, there is evidence of self-regulation that is: enforced, industry-led, 
voluntary, H&S crusader-led, client-led and community-led. It was revealed that in many 
cases, when self-regulation is voluntary, the self-regulatory process does not exceed the first 
stage of self-regulation, adopting or developing standards. The attitudes of the industry 
towards H&S self-regulation can be described as not limited to “camouflage,” “convenience,” 
“context-defined,” “secondary,” “unstructured,” and “tick box.” However, there are some in 
the industry that have a favorable attitude towards H&S where it is “primary” in their 
organization. The understanding of self-regulation and H&S is advanced in this study, 
especially in developing countries, which policymakers, socio-legal scholars, practitioners, 
academics, and various industries may find beneficial.   
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 Introduction  
 
Notably, the construction health and safety (H&S) records of developing countries are 
evidenced as poor (Idoro, 2008; Idoro, 2011; Kheni et al., 2006). Their H&S regulatory 
environments are characterised with inadequate enforcement and poor implementation of 
H&S laws (Kheni et al., 2006) and inadequate H&S laws. In particular, in Nigeria, the 
industry is not covered by any local H&S law (Idoro, 2011; Umeokafor, et al., 2014). 
Consequently, some construction contractors in Nigeria adopt and administer H&S standards 
from developed countries (Idoro, 2008; Idoro, 2011), and/or the National Building Code of 
2006, which is yet to receive legislative backing (Omeife & Windapo, 2013). Additionally, 
the oil and gas industry sets standards that its construction contractors, inter alia, must adhere 
to. As a result, Umeokafor and Isaac (2015) argue that based on the premise of self-
regulation, the aforesaid activities in the Nigerian construction industry is self-regulation in 
various forms. This is where H&S self-regulation is the practice where organisations and/or 
industries develop, adopt and administer programs, standards and policies with little or no 
external intervention (Anderson & Russell, 2011; Castro, 2011; Gunningham, 2011; OECD, 
2015). However, understandably, previous studies such as Idoro (2008, 2011), Umeokafor et 
al., (2014) view the industry as unregulated because the local H&S law does not cover 
construction sites and its activities. This suggests that H&S regulatory issues have been 
addressed only from a state regulatory dimension, overlooking the self-regulatory dimension 
and creating a gap in knowledge. While self-regulation is noted in studies to improve H&S 
(Finger & Gamper-Rabindran, 2013), it is, however, reported in Wall and Dyson (2002) to 
have failed in small firms in New Zealand. 
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The background established so far informs this study, which seeks to advance the 
understanding of construction H&S self-regulation in Nigeria. This paper is a part of the 
empirical evidence in an ongoing research that analyses the attitudes of the Nigerian 
construction industry towards H&S self-regulation, the various approaches to H&S self-
regulation including how they occur. It does not examine the effectiveness of H&S self-
regulation in the Nigerian construction industry nor does it investigate its impact on H&S 
performance. In synthesizing literature, construction H&S in Nigeria and its regulation, and 





Construction health and safety in developing countries 
  
It is noteworthy that developing countries face significant H&S challenges (Farooqui et al., 
2008; Idoro 2011; Kheni et al., 2006). In particular, there is a lack of systematic procedures 
for H&S, and owners/stakeholders in construction companies are not committed to H&S 
(Farooqui et al., 2008). The lack of commitment from owners/stakeholders then result in lack 
of commitment from contractors (Farooqui et al., 2008). Authors note that the poor regulation 
of H&S in the Nigerian construction industry results in a lackadaisical attitude towards H&S 
(Umeokafor et al., 2014). Consequently, accidents are under-reported in developing countries 
such as Nigeria and Ghana (Idoro, 2008; Kheni, et al., 2006) and little resources are allocated 
to H&S (Idoro, 2008). The construction environment in developing countries does not help 
matters as corruption, insecurity, and poor safety culture impact on construction H&S 
practices (Umeokafor, 2015).  
 
Regulation of construction health and safety in Nigeria 
 
The construction H&S regulatory environment of Nigeria is fragmented in that the activities 
of various institutions cut across the industry. For instance, the National Environmental 
Standards and Environmental Regulations Enforcement Agency (NESERA), is charged with 
overseeing environmental safety such as noise standards, demolition. The Factories Act CAP 
FI L.F.N 2004 is the local H&S legislation covering factories in Nigeria. It empowers the 
Inspectorate Division of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity to enforce the law. 
However, Article 87 of the aforementioned law means that construction sites and their 
activities are not covered by the law and are thus unregulated (Idoro, 2008). This, among 
many, has prompted individual efforts in tackling H&S challenges in the sector. In particular, 
construction contractors adopt or develop and administer H&S policies, standards and 
programs, from developed countries (Idoro, 2011). This can be on a voluntary basis or due to 
policies from their foreign parent companies (Umeokafor & Isaac 2015). Additionally, the 
construction sectors of the 36 states of Nigeria adopt the National Building Code of 2006 that 
is yet to receive legislative backing (Omeife & Windapo, 2013). The code sets the minimum 
standards, including safety standards in the building industry. While the oil and gas sector 
also sets H&S standards for all in the industry, including construction contractors 
(Umeokafor & Isaac, 2015), the safety issues in Lagos state of Nigeria, including it 
construction industry is overseen by the Lagos State Safety Commission (Lagos State Safety 
Commission Law, 2011). However, the extent of state involvement is unclear. Nonetheless, 
the fact that the state, out of the 36 states in Nigeria is voluntarily regulating safety issues in 
the state may be considered a kind of self-regulation. Therefore, based on the description of 
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self-regulation, elsewhere in this paper, the Nigerian construction industry is self-regulated in 




Self-regulation takes the form of the general regulatory process (Figure 1). From a self-
regulatory perspective, Regulatory Instruments (RI) are conceptualized in this study to be 
standards, best practices, code of ethics or conducts, policies, and programs (Figure 1). In 
Figure 1, RI are created by the industry and/or organizations or professional institutions (or in 
any combination) who go on to monitor its compliance and implementation, enforcing them 
(Castro, 2011; OCED, 2006). It is also possible to review the entire regulatory process.  
 
 
Figure 1: Self-regulatory process. (Modified from Castro, 2011) 
 
The use of self-policing in achieving compliance in self-regulation is noted in Castro (2011). 
It can be through voluntary self-policing where the industry or professional institutions 
encourage voluntary detection and reporting of a violation through means such as reduction 
of fines (Castro, 2011). There is, however, an overlap at the individual and small organization 
level, when it comes to internal policies. 
 
Self-regulation is flexible, involves the regulated and gives them a sense of belonging. Thus, 
it is tailored to the industry and consumer issues (Anderson & Russell 2011; OCED, 2006) 
and various circumstances (Hutter, 2001). In addition to being an effective regulatory means 
(Anderson & Russell, 2011; OCED 2006), it addresses cost-related issues and reduces the 
burden on the state (Hutter, 2001). Above all, it can achieve a higher level of compliance 
(Anderson & Russell, 2011). Consequently, it is viewed as more effective than the command 
and control regulation. However, there are limitations to self-regulation. Indeed, the extent of 
government involvement or other external involvement may result in conflict (Gunningham, 
2011). Also, one of the parties in the regulatory process may pursue the interest of their 
members (OCED 2006) over the goal of the regulatory process.  
 
Overview of approaches to self-regulation 
 
Self-regulation varies from industry to industry, country to country. A manifestation of self-
regulation is in the combination of private and public regulation (Castro, 2011; Gunningham, 
2011; Hutter, 2001; OCED, 2006). This dual party involvement in regulation is 
conceptualised as co-regulation (Castro, 2011; OCED, 2006; 2015) where it involves 
governmental involvement in the regulatory process. For example, this can be between the 
industry and the government (Castro, 2011; OECD, 2015) or between the government entities 
and other stakeholders, and the industry (OECD, 2015) or between the state and firms. While 
the state and industry can be involved throughout the regulatory process, the state may set 
standards for the companies who then devise means of compliance and monitoring- enforced 
self-regulation (Hutter, 2001). Similarly, Gunningham (2011) notes a case of mandatory self-
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regulation, where firms or industries set the standard and enforce them, but the state approves 
the process and monitors the regulatory process. OCED (2015) reports this as co-regulation. 
In the current study, the above three are viewed as enforced self-regulation. This is in 
addition to the situation where construction contractors are forced to self-regulate because 
they are bound by the H&S policies of their foreign parent companies. 
 
The extent of governmental involvement and legislative backing in enforced self-regulation 
differentiates it from pure self-regulation (see: OCED, 2006). Pure self-regulation 
(Gunningham, 2011) or non-state regulation (Castro, 2011) or self-regulation (OCED, 2006) 
involves the voluntary administration of the regulatory process in Figure 1 with no external 
involvement. This pure self-regulation can be at industry level - industry self-regulation 
(Anderson & Russell, 2011; OECD, 2015) or at firm level. Under industry self-regulation, the 
industry or a group of firms set or agree on rules and standards, monitor and enforce 





The qualitative approach to research is adequate and efficient in answering “what,” “how” 
and “why” research questions (Erikkson & Kovalainen, 2008), and the study should focus on 
complex social phenomena (Isaacs, 2014), seeking to understand the phenomena through the 
eyes of the study population. As the research questions of this study meet the requirements of 
a qualitative study, semi-structured face-to-face and telephone interviews of thirty-seven 
participants and a focus group discussion (FGD) of seven participants were conducted.  
 
Noteworthy, qualitative research raises validity, reliability and transparency issues, so 
investigators should take steps to address the above, ensuring trustworthiness in the research 
(Umeokafor, 2015). Correspondingly, the following steps were completed. For instance, 
using two data collection methods (interviews and FGD) to address the same research 
question (i.e. triangulation) was to ensure validity and trustworthiness in the data (Dainty et 
al., 1997; Denzin, 1978). Additionally, as will be seen below, interview data was collected 
from two sources, that is, from members of the construction supply chain and from key 
informants. This is also another method of triangulation (Denzin, 1978). Other steps to 
improve the trustworthiness in the research include peer reviewing the data collection 
instrument on stakeholders in the Nigerian construction industry and academics who are 
experts in construction and/or H&S. This is in addition to piloting the study on the Nigerian 
construction industry and revising it before the main data collection process. Furthermore, the 
transcripts of the interviews were also sent to the participants that signified interest in 
validating the transcripts. On receipt of their comments, the transcripts were revised. This 
ensures that the views of the respondents are captured. Lastly, peer debriefing was also 
adopted where the principal investigator worked together with not only the co-author but also 
other impartial colleagues, discussing aspects of the study, inter alia, the methodologies, the 
views of the authors.  
 
In the reported study, the participants are members of the construction industry supply chain 
both in the formal and informal sectors, for example, suppliers, quantity surveyors, engineers. 
It also involved key informants with direct or indirect association with the industry or who 
have worked with or for the Nigerian construction industry, for example, a lawyer, an 
insurance practitioner (see the result section for more details). Both in the interviews and 
FGD, the atmosphere for data collection was considered, ensuring that it was convenient and 
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safe for the participants and investigator (Isaacs, 2014). Convenient atmospheres make 
research participants (e.g. interviewees) relaxed; creating an atmosphere that will make them 
speak freely (Isaacs, 2014). This resulted in conducting some of the interviews telephonically 
on the request of the participants. Additionally, as the principal investigator is from a 
university abroad, the participants may not be eager to provide some information just to avoid 
tarnishing the image of the country. On the other hand, it is possible that they will tell the 
investigator what they believe the investigator would like to hear just to please them. 
Consequently, as the principal investigator is Nigerian and has worked in Nigeria for many 
years, he created an atmosphere that would make the participants understand that he was or is 
part of the Nigerian construction industry, demonstrating his understanding of the “Nigerian 
culture.” Language was not a problem, as all the participants had an acceptable understanding 
and command of English.  
 
Prior to the interviews and FGD, introductory letters were sent the participants’ organizations 
(by email and/or in person) introducing the research project and the investigators to them. In 
the letter, the participants were also informed of the following: 
 
1. How the information they provide will be used and how it will be stored.  
2. That they can withdraw from the interview or FGD at anytime. This includes their rights 
to request that the information be withdrawn after two months from the day of the 
interview or FGD.  
3. Their rights to anonymity. 
4. The expected duration of the interview and/or FGD.  
5. That the FGD and/or interviews will only be recorded with their permission. 
 
FGDs can offer insight on views from a group context, showing how the group agrees and 
disagrees on various matters. The principal investigator facilitated the FGD, and it lasted for 
about two hours. Before the FGD, the participants were reminded of the ethical steps in the 
above paragraph. The FGD then started with a self-introduction of the facilitator and the 
scope and objectives of the FGD. This was then followed by the basic rules of the FGD. The 
study was also introduced to the FGD participants. The atmosphere was then made lively 
with icebreakers, local jokes and brief discussions of burning issues in the Nigerian 
construction industry and Nigeria. The participants then had the opportunity of introducing 
themselves to each other. The facilitator then explained the concept of self-regulation to the 
participants. The participants were then introduced to open-ended questions so as to simulate 
discussion. These questions covered:  
 
1. Their roles, association or relationship with the construction industry. 
2. H&S self-regulation in the Nigerian construction industry and/or their organizations 
where applicable, including how it occurs. 
3. How their organizations and/or the industry views H&S self-regulation, including the 
attitudes of their organizations and/or the industry towards H&S self-regulation.  
 
Typically, questions on the attitudes of the industry towards H&S self-regulation such as the 
reactive attitude of the industry towards H&S self-regulation, H&S being viewed as 
responsibility of a certain sector or group in the industry, and open questions on how their 
organizations and the industry view H&S self-regulation were among the questions. 
Similarly, the various types of self-regulation as found in the literature review and how they 
occur were also topics in the FGD, including industry self-regulation and pure self-
regulation. These respondents had to sufficiently describe their experiences to support their 
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claim for any type of self-regulation. At the end of discussing each question, the facilitator 
noted the excerpts of the discourse. Then at the end of the FGD, the facilitator read the 
summary of the excerpts to the participants who validated them. The facilitator then 
concluded by explaining to the FGD participants the importance of keeping the discussion 
confidential.  
 
For the interviews, the participants’ knowledge and understanding of H&S and construction 
were first assessed and if adequate, the other questions were then asked. These questions 
cover those asked in the FGD above. Just like in the FGD, the interview participants were 
reminded of the ethical considerations of the study as earlier stated; for example, anonymity, 
data protection and the option of discontinuing the interview. 
 
In addition to recording both the FGD and interviews, notes were also taken during the 
sessions. During the transcription, notes were also taken and these notes were factored in 
during the analysis. Using NVivo for mac, the data were analyzed in convergence. The 
analysis first started with reading the transcripts many times to have a good understanding of 
the data. The analysis involved analyzing the data without the framework first (i.e. the types 
of self-regulation), seeing how it fits into the framework, (which is outcome-based) before 
using the framework (which is systematic), thus reducing subjectivity and bias and improving 
the trustworthiness of the research. This is evident in the results as themes that are outside the 
framework (i.e. the types of self-regulation) emerged (see Table 2). The themes that emerged 





Demographic information of the respondents 
  
The interviewees were made up of informants with direct or indirect association with the 
construction industry. For example, employees of institutions or organizations whose 
activities cover safety in the industry, an insurance practitioner, members of trade association, 
and a lawyer. Participants from the construction supply chain include: subcontractors, H&S 
consultants and employees of public construction agencies. Others included: engineers, 
project managers, architects, H&S managers and quantity surveyors from consultancy firms 
and/or contracting firms. From the informal sector are: builders, engineers, and clients. The 
FGD of seven participants included a civil engineer, a sub-contractor, a supplier, one client, a 
trade association member, one H&S officer, and a main contractor. All the respondents had a 
minimum of five years work experience in or with the Nigerian construction industry. The 
participants from construction firms are from public institutions, multinational and 
indigenous firms, where many from Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are 
owners/manager and trained construction professionals. 
 
Attitudes of the industry towards health and safety self-regulation 
 
It is vital to define or describe the themes in Table 1 showing how the evidence supports or 
warrants the themes. First, “camouflage,” this is about pretense, deception or motives to hide 
the truth. In other words, it is not what you see that really happens, it is about window 
dressing. For the theme, “secondary,” evidence shows that H&S is treated as less important 
than other things. For the theme “enforced,” evidence shows the attitude that the 
organizations and/or the industry must be forced to self-regulate. For “context-defined,” the 
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attitude here is that the context determines the level of involvement, if self-regulation takes 
place and quality of H&S self-regulation. “Tick box”: the attitude here is to fulfill the 
requirements. “Responsibility” manifests in two ways: viewing H&S as a responsibility thus 
will self-regulate; shifting the responsibility to another party. The theme “convenience” 
shows the attitude of self-regulating when it only involves little trouble or little effort. Those 
classified under “primary” are those that suggest H&S self-regulation as very important; it is 
high on the priority list. Lastly, for the theme “unstructured”, the attitude here is that H&S 
self-regulation is perceived and practiced unsystematically; it is not planned and it is 
unorganized. 
 
Table 1 shows “camouflage” where some SMEs pretend to self-regulate to get contracts or 
because of clients and/or the industry (e.g. oil and gas), after which, they will “water down” 
the H&S self-regulatory process or revert to normal practices. However, some continue to 
self-regulate afterwards. There was no consensus on the latter during the FGD. Further, the 
FGD and interviews revealed that some multinationals also “water down” standards 
compared to what obtains in their parent countries. According to an H&S crusader and 
consultant, construction companies including multinationals do not accept their offer of 
assistance for H&S support; they rather engage in ostensible H&S so that people will see 
them as safety conscious. The respondent stated:  
 
“Requests for assistance from construction companies, including large contractors are very little. 
What they just do in the real sense is that when they are building structures, building roads or 
building bridges they just have somebody there to look like there is health and safety presence. They 
put some cones and signs on the road. Health and safety goes beyond those signs… and cones they 
put on the road.” 
 
Although the contractors may not see any need for assistance, thus will not ask, the above 
quote appears to show pretentious attitude. During the FGD and interviews, there was a 
consensus that the attitude of many construction contractors towards H&S self-regulation is 
“window dressing” (Table 1). Some even set up temporary H&S departments just to secure 
the contracts. One civil engineer stated:  
 
“Well, I will use my own company as an example. When we are vying for all these government 
projects, we always create a fake safety department. It does not really exist; it is for us to get the job 
so that when they come for inspection they will see that we have everything required, that we have 
taken all the measures. We now present to them a safety department with a (fake) safety manager who 
will now tell them how we are going to ensure that we take safety precautions while doing the job. I 
believe all or most of these construction companies are like that.” 
 
According to the above respondent, the civil engineer, prior to doing the above, they must 
have adopted some H&S laws, implementing some to some extent. Another H&S manager 
from a multinational confirmed the above stating he has been invited on many occasions by 
some smaller firms to act as an H&S officer, setting up a temporary H&S department and 
only to leave once the contract is awarded.  
 
Equally important is the understanding that constant H&S self-regulation is mainly for the 
large construction firms (i.e. responsibility: Table 1) and only to be done by small or medium 
firms when there is an incident (“secondary”: Table 1) or when they are forced to 
(“enforced”: Table 1). The respondents mostly opine that the reactive understanding to self-
regulate (i.e after the direct and indirect implications of incidents) mostly occur among SMEs 
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(Table 1). The quote below supports the above- the themes “responsibility” and “secondary.” 
One of the respondents stated:  
 
"They (SMEs) don’t take it (H&S) seriously until the accidents happen… it is only in the large 
construction companies like Berger, Dantata and Sawoe, Strabag, where it is already part and parcel 
of the organisation to self-regulate. Apart from those foreign companies operating in Nigeria, you 
hardly see indigenous companies having H&S. In fact, it is seen as only the responsibility of large 
firms or what only large contractors can do.” 
 
While the above shows that H&S self-regulation is secondary and viewed as the 
responsibility of a particular category in the industry (Table 1), there was consensus during 
the FGD and interviews that businesses self-regulate in various forms as will be seen in Table 
2. Where companies self-regulate, in some cases, there is “top to bottom” approach where the 
management is highly interested in H&S and even chairs the H&S departments or program. 
The aim in some of these organizations is to have a strong H&S culture in the organization. 
Thus, engaging the workers in H&S, training them where and when need be. Basically, the 




Summary of the attitudes in the industry towards H&S self-regulation. 
 Themes Evidence  
Camouflage  Pretentiously adopting some standards that will show the public we are self-regulating, but not 
really adhering to those that the public will not see. SMEs: Window dressing: putting 
procedures that make us appear like we self-regulate so that we can get contracts, but only to 
return to normal practices after we win the contract. Adopting some standards that will make 
us appear to take H&S seriously just to keep the workforce happy.  
Secondary  H&S self-regulation is at convenience. Reactive understanding and attitude because of issues 
such as incidents. Not an integrate part of company policy. One of those things to be done after 
doing the main things.  
Enforced  Both respondents from multinational and indigenous firms note points relating to/on H&S self-
regulation as only enforced. 
Context-
defined 
Multinationals do not maintain the standards from their parent company when in Nigeria – the 
construction environment determines the thoroughness of H&S. Self-regulation is only done in 
the oil and gas, banking, telecommunication sectors; in Lagos state; and oil producing states. 
The type of client or project defines the quality of the H&S procedures or strategies in the 
projects.  
Tick box There is evidence of the attitude of self-regulating to satisfy requirements or conditions without 
considering its efficiency or reading meaning to it. For instance, self-regulating to meet the: 
conditions of prospective contracts; requirements of the industry; norms in a geographic 
location.  
Responsibility  Viewing causal workers as not their responsibility and only covering permanent staff in self-
regulatory programs. Some owners/managers view self-regulation as a favor to the society, and 
not a responsibility. H&S is a responsibility of all in the industry. Self-regulation is the 
responsibility of the government and/or the industry. Self-regulation is a: top to bottom 
approach; bottom to top approach. Only large contractors or the oil and gas sector, or banking 
sectors have a responsibility to self-regulate. 
Convenience  Self regulate where and when convenient. Avoiding self-regulation where possible. Adopting, 
implementing standards based on affordability. 
Primary  Adopt, administer and enforce H&S standards, programs or polices from developed countries 
as a core objective of the firms. Owner/manager leading H&S self-regulation. Employees and 
management participation in self-regulation as a priority. 
Unstructured  Self-regulation is not a thought process. It is informal and unsystematic. It is only considered 
during the construction stage, neglecting the other stages. It is uncoordinated; you do it as you 
like. H&S self-regulation is unplanned.  
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Furthermore, there is a mixture of various philosophies of self-regulation or simultaneous 
approaches to self-regulation in companies. This can be where an organization engages in 
industry self-regulation in a project(s) and in another type of self-regulation in other projects 
(context-defined: Table 1) with different levels of involvement or thoroughness. The project 
or the location of projects or the clients determines if the organization will self-regulate or 
not. The main point here is that it is context-defined (Table 1). Typically, a respondent stated:  
 
“We operate with wisdom here because the way you operate in Shell, if you adopt the same method 
with the federal government, you will lose the contract. The way you operate with the federal 
government, if you try to adopt the same method with a small private client, you will lose the client so 
sometimes you have to follow everybody the way they are and the only thing is that as professionals, 
even though there are no policies for monitoring us on site, on our own we should try to be safety 
conscious or self-regulate”  
 
To conclude, Table 1 shows that there are both favorable and unfavorable attitudes towards 
H&S self-regulation in the Nigerian construction industry. For instance, the theme “primary” 
is favorable, but the themes such as “camouflage,” “secondary” are unfavorable.  
 
On a different point, evidence suggests that many construction businesses, excluding large 
contractors tend to concentrate on less effective strategies in the hierarchy of risk control (i.e. 
personal protective equipment (PPE). Additionally, so many of the respondents directly or 
indirectly used PPE as a standard of comparison for H&S.  
 
Types of self-regulation 
 
Table 2 shows the types of H&S self-regulation found in the study. It is vital to remember 
that some types of self-regulation have been described elsewhere in this paper. However, 
there are efforts to describe some in Table 2 that were not earlier covered, showing how the 
evidence warranted the themes.  
 
In addition to Table 2, there are some other significant findings. The size of firms was viewed 
to highly determine the types of self-regulation that occur in the industry and how they occur. 
There is evidence that small businesses rarely self-regulate, when they do, it is informal 
and/or unsystematic and simplistic or enforced, but the medium firms differ as seen below. 
Most large construction firms are enforced to self-regulate.  
 
H&S crusader-led regulation (Table 2) may be as a result of an organization voluntarily 
approaching the H&S crusader for support or the H&S crusader naming and shaming the 
organizations, after covert or overt inspections by the H&S crusader.  
 
The role of clients in H&S self-regulation is also well noted in the interviews (client-
led/enforced: Table 2). From the FGD and interviews, the client is at the forefront of H&S, 
specifying the standards or insisting that H&S standards or programs are adopted, enforced 
and monitored. The interviews showed that these clients range from international to local 
clients but the FGD shows that these clients are mainly international clients. In the 
interviews, there is evidence that local clients can be individuals with high level of H&S 
awareness. They can also be individuals: who have worked in the oil and gas industry; who 
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Table 2 
 
Summary of types of H&S self-regulation  
Types of self-
regulation/themes Evidence  
Voluntary/pure Voluntary adoption and administration of H&S standards and policies based on 
affordability. 
Collective development and implementation of H&S strategies and measures in the 
absence of H&S department in SMEs. 
Voluntary structured development, implementation and administration of H&S 
policies in both SMEs and Large firms.  
Client led/enforced Clients specify that contractors adopt H&S standards, allocate funds and in many 
cases enforce and monitor the implementation.  
Industry Contractors adopt and administer existing standards in oil and gas or banking or 
telecom sectors. Oil and gas companies and banks audit the H&S records of 
contractors prior to the award of contracts; they then go on to monitor and inspect the 
H&S standards in the projects. 
Mandatory/enforced Chain effect: Multinationals set standards that medium firms meet because they (the 
multinationals) have to meet standards set by their international parent companies. 
Standards set by regulatory authorities such as NESREA are met, through strategies 
developed by organization.  
Parent company policies from abroad, or adopted H&S laws from abroad compel 
organizations to self-regulate  
H&S crusader-led H&S crusaders enforce H&S policies through inspections, consultation, partnering, 
and naming and shaming contractors with poor or pretentious or no H&S policy, 
making many to improve. 
Community-led The communities stipulate that standards are developed or adopted, enforced and 
monitored.  
Communities participate in the self-regulatory process.  
 
Evidence from the FGD and interviews show strong influence and involvement of the local 
communities in H&S regulations, thus warranting the type of self-regulation, community-led 
self-regulation (Table 1). Here the communities where the projects take place will require the 
construction firms to adopt H&S standards or programs and enforce and monitor them. These 
communities always want to be part of the regulatory process. This can be through appointed 
representatives from the communities. These companies must adhere to these standards or the 
communities will disrupt their activities.  
 
However, there are issues of concern in terms of community-led H&S self-regulation. In 
particular, few respondents in both the FGD and interviews note that in some cases these 
communities require that they be provided with the funds to employ an independent H&S 
consultant or to engage in some local H&S programs. However, when the funds are provided, 
the funds are diverted to private pockets. Many of the respondents in the interviews also 
decried the high cost of H&S due to community involvement because they already have their 
own standards or programs and H&S experts but because of the communities, they may have 
to make some adjustments to them. For instance, one respondent stated: 
 
“When you work in some communities, especially in the oil producing states, they require you to use 
some of their recommended health, safety and environment consultants. They even require you to 
employ some people from their communities. They do not care if you already have competent workers. 
They do not care if you have experts that carry out the environmental test for you. No, they do not 
care; they just want it their way. This increases cost for us.” 
 
As a result, few respondents conclude that, in some cases, there are conflicts between the 
contractors and the communities.  
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There is also evidence of enforced/mandatory H&S self-regulation in both the FGD and 
interviews, but with more emphasis during the interviews. The evidence includes compulsory 
company policies or international standards and local laws that cut across the construction 
industry (Table 2). According to these respondents, these local laws include environment 
laws that regulate pollution and noise.  
 
In terms of pure self-regulation, few respondents demonstrated that they voluntarily self-
regulate from the design stage to the post-construction stage, covering the stages in figure 1. 
However, there is also evidence that plenty of SMEs that engage in pure self-regulation adopt 
a simplistic approach or a system that is superficial or not thought through. In some cases, 
they mainly adopt regulations covering PPE, welfare facilities, and first aid. There is also 
evidence of self-regulation here stopping at only adoption of standards in SMEs, neglecting 
the second stage- monitoring compliance and implementation of the RI (Figure 1) and so on. 
The latter is also evident when enforced self-regulation involves governmental agencies 
whose regulatory activities cut across construction. 
 
Equally important is industry self-regulation where there is no evidence of formal industry 
regulatory body in the construction industry. However, the FGD and interviews evidence oil 
and gas regulatory set standards that then have a chain effect on the construction industry in 
that the standards set in the industry cover all construction contractors that work for them. Oil 




There is good evidence of self-regulation, but the quality, in some cases, remains 
questionable. However, this offers optimism, especially, as the contexts such as the socio-
economic context of Nigeria do not encourage involvement in H&S. The strong emphasis on 
concentration on the first stage of self-regulation –development and/or adoption of RI, 
leaving out the second stage onwards, tends to be a major challenge in H&S regulation in the 
Nigerian construction industry (see: Idoro, 2008; Umeokafor et al., 2014). The plenty of 
significant emphasis on the use of less effective risk control measures such as PPE is 
consistent with the “traditional stage” of safety culture in Lingard and Rowlinson (2005), 
which is reactive. The continued dominance of the reactive style of H&S management does 
not only leave the Nigerian construction industry lagging, but also increases the cost of H&S 
compared to if the innovative approach to H&S management is dominant. The innovative 
approach is characterised by proactive measures such as emphasis on elimination of risk 
where possible, paying greater attention to integrating safety at the decision making stage of 
projects (Lingard & Rowlinson, 2005). However, elimination of risk where possible can lead 
to risk aversion, which is not good for business, so care should be taken in such cases. More 
importantly, there is a thin line between pure self-regulation and internal policies (H&S 
management) at organizational level, but in the context of this study, that organizations 
voluntarily design and/or adopt and administer H&S standards is pure self-regulation.  
 
In terms of the attitudes of the industry towards H&S self-regulation, the evidence in Table 1 
suggests that the quality of H&S self-regulation may be poor. For example, if contractors 
self-regulate when it is convenient or if it is context- defined or if it is viewed as secondary, 
the attention it receives is likely to be low. It is likely to be low on the priority list of the 
organization. This may explain the concentration on the first stage of self-regulation – 
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developing and/or adopting RI. Additionally, Table 1 to some extent arguably also 
contributes to explaining why there are various types of self-regulation as seen in Table 2. 
 
Meanwhile, the influence of large contractors on medium-scale firms (i.e. the chain effect in 
Table 2) offers optimism in that it can be exploited for improving H&S, as the medium-scale 
firms would want to retain their contracts. In affirmation, Sunindijo (2015) argues that greater 
emphasis on improving H&S in developing countries should be on large construction firms. 
The evidence of H&S crusader-led regulation suggests that it may even be ideal to factor in 
external actors such as independent pressure groups in the regulatory process. H&S crusader-
led regulation differs from social pressure (a driver of H&S self-regulation: Umeokafor & 
Isaac, 2015) in that in H&S crusader-led regulation, the H&S crusader and the companies 
work together to improve safety standards while under social pressure the companies are 
pressured to self-regulate by external actors such as pressure groups, the media without the 
involvement of the external actors.  
 
More importantly, the involvement of the communities in H&S regulation also offers 
optimism, but there is a risk of deviation in the interest of the communities from H&S interest 
to financial gain. If there is a form of third party involvement such as the government who 
will act as an observer, community-led H&S self-regulation may be quite impactful in 
Nigeria.  
 
While Table 1 shows the attitude, “enforced,” where self-regulation can hardly be voluntary, 
Table 2 shows it as a type of self-regulation. Therefore, it is logical to say that the attitude 
that H&S must be enforced in Table 1 underpins the enforced type of H&S self-regulation in 
Table 2. Above all, this study indicates that H&S laws that integrate and/or foster flexible 





This study advances the understanding of regulation of construction H&S in Nigeria and the 
concept of self-regulation. This stems from the premise that the Nigerian construction 
industry is not unregulated as earlier authors note. Based on qualitative approach, there is 
good evidence in this study that SMEs self-regulate but in some cases, it is not systematic. It 
is evident that many SMEs adopt laws based on severity of risks; they also self-regulate 
because multinationals require them to self-regulate. However, there is evidence that they 
also transfer the knowledge and skills from working with multinationals in some projects, but 
the quality may need improvement. It is also evident that there are both favorable and 
unfavorable attitudes towards H&S self-regulation in that in some cases: it is a camouflage; it 
is secondary; it is primary; it is done only when it is convenient; it is context-based/defined. 
The aforesaid, among many, may explain the evidence in this study that there is: client-led 
self-regulation, H&S crusader-led regulation, inter alia, community-led self-regulation. 
These findings have implications on the developing countries, as there may be elements of 
one type of self-regulation or the other because of inadequate H&S regulatory environment in 
these countries. Some findings in this study also indicate the determinants of H&S self-
regulation. Nonetheless, some limitations of this study suggest the need for further studies. 
Indeed, examining the Nigerian construction industry holistically may mean that certain 
characteristics that are solely formal/informal sector-based may need further examination. 
Thus, further studies can explore the discourse from a formal or informal perspective, helping 
to deepen the understanding of this discourse.  
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